In a development holding out wide-ranging implications, the United States and Europe Saturday lifted sanctions on Iran in exchange for Teheran’s implementation of its end of last year’s nuclear deal that stops the oil-rich Persian nation – embroiled in an intense geostrategic rivalry with the Arab world – from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The removal of sanctions – which will immediately add $ 50 billion to Iranian money – is significant in multiple ways : In the U.S. it quashes chances of Washington going to war with Iran, although at the same time it provides a fodder for some Republicans to up their angry politics in the highly charged 2016 presidential election season; In the Middle East, the removal of restrictions means emergence of Iran as a major oil-seller as well as a regional force with newfound leverage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia; In South Asia, the development means unlocking of Iran’s energy in the form of oil and gas for Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, although it also brings the unpredictable country much additional influence.
The implementation of the nuclear deal gives President Barack Obama an achievement that could be showcased as defining his legacy – in terms of minimizing prospects of a war over Iranian nuclear program and creating a new balance of power in the Middle East.
Secretary of State John Kerry hailed the lifting of Iran sanctions, saying “Today marks the start of a safer world.
“We understand this marker alone will not wipe away all the concerns the world has rightly expressed about Iran’s policies in the region. But we also know there isn’t a challenge in the entire region that wouldn’t become much more complicated, much worse, if Iran had a nuclear weapon,” he added.
How far Iran is able to use its new status to its advantage will depend on how quickly it stabilizes its economy – something that would in turn depend on the degree to which it is able to come out of the multilayered regional conflicts.
In the larger perspective, Iran’s return to the global oil and trade market marks a major milestone for the theocratic regime since 1979 revolution, which had tumultuous repercussions in the region with both Saudi Arabia and Iran entering into a competition of sectarian influence, proxy games and poisonous militant narratives.
As time would unfold, other developments in the year 1979 including Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and execution of Pakistan’s popular deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – also contributed to the rise of parochial militant climate. The Western, Arab, and Pakistani support and glorification of the Jihad in Afghanistan, Iran’s descent into a repressive country with ambitions for regional clout through militant proxies and wars, subsequent rise of Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, the Taliban and now ISIS or Daesh have sent the entire region into a turmoil.
The Middle Eastern predicament has particularly ballooned out of proportions over the last few years since the inception of the Arab Spring revolts with a harrowing erosion of respect for human rights.
With this background, what will be implications of the international community’s embrace of Iran as an influential member – in a world far different from what it used to be even a decade ago?
One thing is certain that the region is in for acceptance of new realities as the old order – with Riyadh enjoying monopoly over oil trade or influence – is giving way to a scenario where Iran will be an equal or perhaps more powerful regional country, due to creative talents of Iranian people in the fields of arts, sciences and engineering. That certainly will depend on if and how quickly radicals in Teheran allow free flow of ideas and exchanges with the world.
As for political clout, Iran is unlikely to expand that further anytime soon due to two reasons: The region is already in flames with Iraq and Syria practically existing in name with little or no control over their resources or effective governance.
Secondly, Iran is surrounded by rich Arab states with significant international stakes and investments, and it appears improbable that the regional capitals would accept Teheran as the new leader in the near future.
Thirdly, the major world powers including China, which gulps down huge amounts of oil to fuel its economy, and Western nations may launch a concerted effort to calm down Saudi-Iranian tensions. The alternative – chaos around major Gulf trade centers, ports and Hormuz strait – would be a recipe for slowdown in global economy, which, despite record low oil prices, is stagnating yet again.
One possible calculation for Iran in the game of strategic balance of power or superiority would be to open up internally with reforms that allow freedom of expression and creative pursuits to its people. Now that it has come out of international isolation, will Teheran’s religious and political leadership – Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani -show pragmatism? Concurrently, will Teheran ratchet down its participation in proxy wars through support for exclusivist and retrogressive regimes in Syria, Iraq and militant groups elsewhere in the region?
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, unnerved by the U.S. tilt toward Iran, is not likely to sit quietly, and as evidenced by the recent execution of a Shiite cleric, it might do everything in its power to provoke and engage Iran in a permanent state of war.
What remains to be seen is whether Saudi Arabia and Iran would remain trapped in Middle Eastern fault lines or come up with a different approach to coexist peacefully. Their current policies emanate few hopes.
Saudi Arabia’s shaky situation proves one point – if Riyadh had taken care of its people with the oil money – by empowering them politically, economically and socially – King Salman bin Abdulaziz would not have found his country as vulnerable as it looks now. An instructive lesson for all states, particularly both Iranian and Saudi Arabian conservative regimes. They have long been gagging free speech, and flagrantly violating human rights of their people, particularly minorities. The two states are also seen as equally responsible for horrors, the Syrians, Iraqis and Yemenis have gone through in civil wars and multiple conflicts.
How Israel will react to Iran’s enlarging status in the region and the larger international chessboard remains to be seen. Russia may also gain from Iran’s expanding reach regionally and internationally.
In South Asia, Pakistan, which must perform a fine-tuned diplomatic dance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, feels relieved at the diminishing perils of another war on its border. But the bitter rivalry between Riyadh and Teheran also pitches it into a difficult position.
Economically, the end to Iranian sanctions regime, opens up new vistas of trade and energy for Islamabad. The energy-starved nation of around 180 million people can now look forward to materialization of Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, which eventually may become Iran-Pakistan-India project. The import of Iranian oil and gas will diversify energy sources for Islamabad.
The actualization of IPI project would be a win-win for all. It will earn Islamabad Indian stakes in Pakistan’s stability as well as improve its relations with Teheran. On the other end, Iran will also have expanded its regional sway.
Another major incentive for Pakistan to maintain stability on its borders, particularly on its western border with Afghanistan and southwestern border with Iran is the high-stakes it has in success of the mammoth China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will see Beijing export trading goods via Pakistani land routes and Gwadar seaport as well as import energy from the Gulf region. Not far from Gwadar, Iran may step up work on Chahbahar seaport in cooperation with India to amass further leeway with the region.
Strategic dynamics dictate that Pakistan should do every thing possible to maintain good relations with both Saudi Arabia – the biggest source of foreign remittances – and Iran – an increasingly important neighbor with ability to wield considerable sway in both Afghanistan and Central Asia.
The impending visits by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif to both Riyadh and Teheran seem timely, in accordance with changing geostrategic scenario. Their message should be clear with the bottom line that Islamabad wants stability in the region and productive relations with both but it would not become an active battleground of competing Saudi or Iranian ideologies, which in the past cost Islamabad so heavily.
As the world reengages Iran constructively, the region has a thousand logical and unintended repercussions to hazard in the midst of unprecedented geopolitical crises and riddles jolting the Middle East.
