Photo by Michael Vadon via Wikimedia Commons
On the last Saturday in January, while crowds gathered to protest an Executive Order temporarily banning travel to the US by Muslims from seven countries, President Trump talked by phone for more than an hour with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders focused mainly on ways to take action against international terrorism – the first in what’s expected to be a series of substantive discussions on major issues.
The call was the first contact between Trump and Putin since the US inauguration, and followed weeks of speculation that the new US president – who has talked often about improving relations with Moscow – would lift the sanctions imposed by former President Barack Obama. According to spokesmen for both the White House and the Kremlin, the question of sanctions did not come up in the late-January Trump-Putin phone call.
Since long before the November election, Trump’s critics have noted his mastery in managing his own media coverage by drawing reporters away from a potentially damaging story with a well-timed distraction. By the end of his first week in office, Washington editors and fact-checkers were wondering aloud if he had done it again – arousing emotions and prompting large demonstrations by announcing a temporary ban on Muslem visitors and immigrants in order to dampen coverage of the potentially major shift in America’s long-term foreign policy toward Russia. Intentional or not, the parallel tracks divided media resources, and the substance of the phone conversation between Trump and Putin was given less time and space.
Setting aside media tactics, it’s important to take an extended look at the long-term effects of what seems certain to be a warming period in relations between the US and Russia. The key questions going forward revolve around the separate intentions of Donald Trump’s United States and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and the impact of those intentions around the world.
US Foreign Policy In Flux
During the Cold War the United States was driven by its determination to limit the global influence of the Soviet Union. Confrontations over ideology and politics led to local and regional conflict – wars both short and long – and to US policies aimed at reducing the chances that international communism would succeed in drawing support around the world. This relentless struggle ended when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, and former Soviet republics became new independent nations.
In this early period of euphoria supporters of democracy saw an opening for welcoming Russia into the international community, dominated by the US and Western democracies. Historian Francis Fukuyama wrote a best-selling book suggesting the “end of history,” a time when democratic states would not go to war with each other and peace would be assured. Trade relations were established, political alliances were adjusted, nuclear disarmament talks moved forward, and barriers to working relationships diminished. Washington and
Moscow seemed on track to take part in a new world order.
This assessment was given a boost when elections were held in 1996, returning Boris Yeltsin to power with the support of a coalition of Russian oligarchs. The US and the West applauded the defeat of the nostalgic, struggling Communist Party.
Those elections proved to be the high point for reformists, as Yeltsin – struggling with health problems and a restless oligarchy – gradually lost government control and popular support, handing the presidency over to a young former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin. In the absence of legal foundations for governing and a strategic plan for continued reform, Putin was able to take over, make changes as he wished, and convince the Russian people that he would protect their interests and their nation. This began the long slide toward authoritarian rule.
Critics of US policy – not all of them in post-Cold War Russia – say the West in those early years put too much stress on the need for internal economic “reforms” based on integration into Western economic and political institutions. Defenders of those efforts responded, citing the need to move decisively through the narrow window of opportunity provided by the collapse of Soviet communism and the weakening of Moscow’s governing institutions.
Since Putin’s ascension to power in 1999, US presidents have sought to “re-set” relations with Moscow. President Clinton’s effort disappeared in the cloud of dust raised by NATO’s bombing of Serbia – a longtime Russian ally – during the Balkan wars; President Bush believed he had seen Putin’s soul when he looked into the Russian leader’s eyes. President Obama suggested a deeper look would have seen something quite different, but was unable to rationalize relations with Moscow during two terms in office. President Trump – who, while campaigning, called for Russia to hack into Hillary Clinton’s e-mails – says it’s likely he’ll be able to get along just fine with Putin, and smooth out the wrinkles in the Washington-Moscow relationship.
Sen. John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has warned Trump to be careful, and not to lift US sanctions. In a statement released after Trump’s telephone cal with Putin, McCain said, “he should remember that the man on the other end of the line is a murderer and a thug who seeks to undermine American national security interests at every turn. For our commander-in-chief to think otherwise would be naïve and dangerous.”
Putin, and Russia, Today
Vladimir Putin has long since won over the support of the Russian people; Levada, a respected Russian pollster, showed an approval rating for Putin last August of 82%. This incredible result is believed to flow from his consistent appeal to the Russian populace to see him as a strong and trustworthy defender of their nation’s pride. In pursuit of approval he often cites efforts by foreign powers – named or un-named – who seek to undermine his authority, diminish the Russian economy, and control or limit Russia’s role in its own neighborhood and around the world. Western critics – and even some dissenting Russian voices – say he’s wrong.
Even considering a margin of error of 3.4%, Putin’s total is roughly twice the current approval rating of the new American president. (Trump insists polls in the US are deeply flawed, citing the many polls that showed him losing the election to Hillary Clinton; indeed, he has a point.)
Putin’s approval rating is all the more remarkable because of the continuing struggles within the Russian economy. In the past three years the ruble has lost half its value, and GDP – following a modest recovery after the worldwide recession in 2008 – has diminished; in 2015 it showed negative economic growth, according to the World Bank. State statistics show average Russians outspending their incomes, with the volume of retail trade dropping by 10% in 2015 – lower than in 1970.
Beyond its borders Russia’s economic struggles are reflected in reduced prices for its principal export – petroleum – and a lack of sufficient gains in sales of natural gas, timber, and wood products to make up the difference. Manufacturing is slight, with military armaments leading other industries in the export market. Russia is the world’s second-largest weapons supplier, after the United States.
In recent years Moscow’s main customers have been India, China, and Vietnam.
The sluggish economy is making life difficult for the Kremlin – and just as difficult for the Russian people. Despite periodic campaigns to combat alcoholism, consumption of vodka and other spirits is among the highest in the world; in the use of opiates, Russia ranks first.
High crime and murder rates are also reported by state agencies, and the Russian Duma recently passed a controversial measure decriminalizing domestic violence for first-time offenders. The effort was defended by lawmakers who called it recognition of an old Russian proverb, that “if he beats you it means he loves you.” Dissenters call it a return to the days of Ivan the Terrible.
The high approval rating for Putin may be seen as a paradox, given the measurable increase in protests against the impact of a slow economy. State agencies say these protests – in big cities and small towns – are prompted by economic strains, not political issues, and that people who were once fearful of losing jobs for speaking out are now making their voices heard.
Putin’s high rating among the Russians polled last August are also attributed to his near-total control of mass media. State TV channels carry news to all corners of Russia’s eleven time zones, and limit or eliminate criticism of Putin. He is daily seen in statesman-like situations, criticizing his critics abroad and boasting of his achievements at home. There are no more video clips of him galloping on horseback, bare-chested, across the countryside.
Back to the Future?
Against this backdrop, Vladimir Putin is seen in the West as an absolute ruler determined to restore his country to the prominence it enjoyed for decades as the controlling center of the Soviet Union. This restoration will be accomplished by various means, his critics say, with some of them harking back to the days of the Cold War. In those days Moscow moved militarily into nearby territories – Eastern Europe then, Eastern Ukraine now – and worked to keep adversaries off-balance by being unpredictable. The Kremlin’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was not foreseen; neither was Russian participation in the bombing of parts of Syria in 2015.
A tactic of Moscow’s foreign strategies going back to Tsarist Russia has been to conduct complex and concerted campaigns to divide its perceived enemies, in an effort to weaken their resolve and their strength. For decades in the 20th century the Kremlin cited the poverty of America’s working class and the crime rates in its cities – along with unproductive foreign “adventures” – as evidence that the US was rotting from within. Twentieth-century propaganda wars took the place of factual reporting, and Western media were excoriated as dishonest in their methods and criminal in their intent.
Those same criticisms, in updated form, are voiced today in Moscow about foreign media coverage of Russia. It is worrisome to those who monitor the Kremlin and the White House that those same criticisms, aimed at America, are coming from Donald Trump.
In light of this, it’s too early to predict the nature or the impact of improvements in US-Russian relations – or if, in fact, a new and better world order is on the horizon at all. What comes next in the discourse between these two world leaders is anybody’s guess.
