The Battle for Pakistan and the US Relations

“In 2008,” Shuja Nawaz writes in the preface to his recently published book, The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighborhood, “I began working on the event that led to The Battle for Pakistan as a Pakistani citizen and ended it as an American.” 

It is a labor of love, but, and here is the remarkable thing, there are two objects of love, not one—both the US and Pakistan. This double love in an important sense ensures objectivity as the author must keep a balance in his judgments between the two countries. Shuja is somewhat self-consciously not taking sides: the book is “dedicated to the well-being of both countries … I pray that this recent history of the US-Pakistan relationship can help bring both my homelands together.”

In the preface, Shuja shares with the reader his personal background which almost predisposes him to respect those in uniform: “I belong to an old military family and a warrior clan, the Janjua Rajputs, and take pride in my heritage. I respect all those who wear the uniform for their desire and willingness to serve and protect their homeland against all enemies.” His support for the military is heightened by the fact that his elder brother, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, who he looked up to, had attained the highest position in the Pakistan army, that of Chief of Army Staff.

However, he is quick to clarify that his sympathy for the Pakistan army does not mean in any way advocacy of Martial Law: “But I do not support the military as a substitute for civil government. Nor do I favor the politicization of the military, in Pakistan and the US, both. At the same time, I take seriously my responsibility, as an observer and commentator, to cast light on the strengths and weaknesses of the militaries in both countries, and the political systems that they serve, so that they can be improved. It is important that informed observers continue to tell truth to power in Pakistan and not be seen as traitors. Constructive criticism will help Pakistan improve itself, so its narrative can be based on verifiable reality.”

In a subsection of Chapter 4 from “From Tora Bora to Pathan Gali” called Freefalling Relationship he describes the dangers, Pakistan faced after the raid on Pakistan which killed Osama bin Laden. Pakistan, he writes, feared that India with its ever-increasing advanced technology might be inspired by the Abbottabad raid to try a similar operation against Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In the next chapter, “Internal Battles,” he describes the attacks by militants on PNS Mehran, a naval base in Karachi.

Underlying the importance of the Pakistan army to the relationship, Shuja gives us a full chapter called “Transforming the Pakistan Army” (Chapter 11) on this very topic. In this chapter, he correctly makes the assessment that “Pakistan has fought numerous external wars with its bigger neighbor, India.

The biggest lesson from those encounters appears to be that Pakistan must have a proactive defense that will allow it to protect its territory while making India pay a heavy price in case it ever invades Pakistan. Hence, its forward nuclear posture and support of irregular warfare to keep India busy in Kashmir. And its ambivalence in the war inside Afghanistan that remains a bone of contention with the US.”

It is in the closing chapters of the book, especially the last chapter, “Choices”, that Shuja gives us some guidelines for the future. This is a long chapter but worth studying. It has useful divisions with titles like Improving the US-Pakistan Relationship, and What can the US Do?

It is precisely Shuja’s sure-footed knowledge of the upper slopes in Washington DC and Islamabad that gives him access which is almost unique in scholars of the field. He is as familiar with the corridors of power in Washington as he is in Islamabad. His appointment as the first Director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center where he continues as a distinguished fellow gave him, and continue to give him, easy access for his research interests.

To his familiarity with the capital cities and its power-players is added Shuja’s own decades of study and writing. Indeed, his previous book was an authoritative study of the Pakistan army. This book too comes with plenty of footnotes enough to please the most pedantic historian. Shuja’s literary background, he is a published poet of note, is evident in his references to the literary giants like George Bernard Shaw, Mark Twain, and Charles Dickens.  But his background leads to a feature of Shuja’s study which is both its strength and its weakness.

Emblazoned across the covers inside and out are glowing tributes by some of the best-known names in US-Pakistan relations. There are for example the senior generals, David Petraeus, James Jones, and even Admiral Arun Prakash, a former Indian chairman, Chiefs of Staff. There are similarly important Pakistan names of similar stature, names which include General Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s former head of the army.

Included are also senior political figures on both sides like Chuck Hagel, former US Secretary of Defense and Senator; and from Pakistan Riaz Mohammed Khan, former Foreign Secretary. These are only some of the heavyweight names that feature in the book. While they provide us unique insights, they also confirm for us the fact that Shuja has relied heavily on them as sources of information.

The result is that the book is top-heavy and we rarely know the impact of the vagaries of the US-Pakistan relationship on the ordinary Pakistani in the former Tribal Areas  – which have now been incorporated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province –  or the villagers of the Punjab or Sindh. Inadvertently perhaps the book gives us a view of the relationship through the prism of the elites of both countries, the generals, and the ambassadors.

This is a general methodological characteristic of the think tanks of both countries. So, while we are provided sharp insights into the macro dealings, we rarely hear the voices of the more humble and less influential people that truly matter and who in the end will suffer the consequences of the follies of the high and mighty.

As the focus of the US-Pakistan relationship rests in their relationship with Afghanistan, a study of the dynamics between the three is essential when finding answers to peace. While Shuja has pointed to the problems between the center and periphery, I would have been happier if he had gone more deeply into the often-overlooked players in this geopolitical game who live in the former Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

And in the former Tribal Areas, I would have suggested a closer look at Waziristan which is a key to peace in both Pakistan and Afghanistan; the TTP which has played havoc in Pakistan is largely based in the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan Agency and groups like the Haqqani living in North Waziristan Agency are notorious for targeting Afghanistan. As we know, Waziristan was the most targeted place on earth by American drones.

As it stands neither Waziristan nor the major tribes that dominate it, the Mehsud and the Wazir, get a mention in the index. In contrast, General Ashfaq Kayani, former head of the Pakistan Army, has half a column of references in the index; other generals like David Petraeus, James Mattis, and Stanley McChrystal have a dozen references each. Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP, is given a passing reference but only as a possible suspect in Benazir Bhutto’s assassination.

I have studied some forty tribal societies living on the periphery of the state across North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucuses, and South Asia. These include the tribal societies of Pakistan. The findings are published in my book The Thistle and the Drone.

There is a full chapter on Waziristan.  Invariably the center looks on tribal societies on the periphery as backward, primitive, and even a hindrance to the center’s aspirations of political and economic development.

There is clear cultural and political prejudice against the periphery. That is why it is important to present a picture that balances the worldview of both the center and the periphery. One without the other will present an incomplete picture of reality. Perhaps Shuja will compensate in a future edition of the book by giving us his insights into the former Tribal Areas and its impact on the larger politics of the region.

Methodological quibbles aside, The Battle for Pakistan is nonetheless a deep and scholarly study of an important aspect of relations between two important nations in difficult times.

It is indispensable reading for those wishing to understand better the complicated and changing nature of the relationship; and there can be no better guide than Shuja Nawaz. If you are looking for an authoritative book on US-Pakistan relations and why these relations matter to you, look no further than The Battle for Pakistan.